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CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY:
SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW

Wilson R. Huhn*

constantly looked to,
constantly labored for,
and even though never perfectly attained,
constantly approximated . . . .1
In 1988, renowned historian Edmund S. Morgan published Inventing the
People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America.2 In that brilliant
and wide-ranging book Morgan traces how, between the time of the English Civil
War in the mid-seventeenth century and the adoption of the American Constitution
in 1787, the idea of “popular sovereignty”—the right of the people to govern
themselves—replaced the notion of “the divine right of kings” as the acknowledged
source of political power.3 The central theme of Morgan’s work is that while
popular sovereignty is a “fiction” in the sense that the people of a nation cannot
actually rule themselves without creating a government,4 over the centuries our
ancestors constantly labored to create a society and a government which gradually
came closer to the realization of that principle—a closer approximation of the ideal
of popular sovereignty.5 At the end of Inventing the People, Morgan concludes:
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr.,
Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. I wish to thank my colleagues, Tracy
Thomas, Elisabeth Reilly, and Richard Aynes, for their valuable comments and suggestions,
and my research assistant, Joshua Dean, for his untiring efforts. This research was funded
with a summer fellowship from The University of Akron School of Law.
1
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26,1857), reprinted in 2
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 406 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter
COLLECTED WORKS] (referring to the “standard maxim for free society” that “all men are
created equal”).
2
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
3
See id. at 54 (“[T]he paths taken in both England and America were first laid out in
seventeenth-century England when Parliament challenged the king and replaced divine right
with the sovereignty of the people.”); id. at 255–56 (summarizing the work of the Levelers,
John Locke, and other English citizens from that era who developed the principle of popular
sovereignty).
4
See id. at 13 (“Government requires make-believe”).
5
See id. at 152 (“The history of popular sovereignty in both England and America after
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From its inception in the England of the 1640s the sovereignty of the people had been filled with surprises for those who
invoked it. It was a more dynamic fiction than the one it replaced, more capable of serving as a goal to be sought, never
attainable, always receding, but approachable and worth approaching. It has continually challenged the governing few to
reform the facts of political and social existence to fit the aspirations it fosters. The presumption that social rank should convey
a title to political authority was only the first casualty in its
reformations, and we have not yet seen the last. The fiction
endures. The challenge persists.6
The principle of popular sovereignty is what distinguished the new American
republic from every other nation which preceded it in human history.7 Popular
sovereignty remains the single most important animating principle of American
constitutional law. But the concept of popular sovereignty is not a simple, unitary
idea; instead, it comprises a number of interrelated and mutually reinforcing elements. In particular, the American conception of popular sovereignty embraces the
following seven fundamental principles:
1. The Rule of Law. The people are sovereign and their will is expressed
through law. The Constitution is ordained and established as law—the
supreme law of the land.
2. Limited Government. The people are sovereign, not the government.
By adopting the Constitution the people created the government, imposed limits upon its power, and divided that power among different
levels and branches.
3. Inalienable Rights. Every individual person is sovereign in the sense
that he or she retains certain inalienable rights, which the government
is bound to respect.
4. Equal Political Rights. Each person is a sovereign political actor;
therefore each person has an equal right to participate in government.
Accordingly, the Constitution protects freedom of political expression,
1689 can be read as a history of the successive efforts of different generations to bring the
facts into closer conformity with the fiction, efforts that have gradually transformed the very
structure of society.”).
6
Id. at 306.
7
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 761
(1994) [hereinafter Amar, Central Meaning] (referring to the people’s adoption of the
Constitution of the United States as “the most participatory, majoritarian (within each state)
and populist event that the planet Earth had ever seen”).
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freedom of political association, the equal right to vote, and the principle of majority rule.
5. Separation of Church and State. The people are sovereign, not God.
Laws reflect the will of the people, not the presumed will of God.
Religious authority is not a legitimate basis to support the enactment or
interpretation of any law or the adoption of any official practice.
6. The Power of the National Government Over the States. The American
people are sovereign, not the states. No state has the power to secede
from the union or to nullify any federal law. The states retain only
those powers not granted to the federal government or reserved to the
people.
7. National Independence and the Limited Authority of International Law.
The American people as a whole are sovereign and independent and are
not subject to any foreign law or power. The political representatives
of the American people have the power to abrogate treaties or other
forms of international law.
Over the centuries each of these constitutional principles has blossomed and
borne fruit. As Morgan predicted, the principle of popular sovereignty in all of its
manifestations has continued to change and develop, resulting in profound changes
in the interpretation of the Constitution.8
Part I of this article defines the meaning of the term “sovereignty” generally.
Part II describes how the concept of popular sovereignty was understood in America
at the time of the founding and during the antebellum period, particularly as it found
expression in the Declaration of Independence and the speeches of Abraham
Lincoln. Part III of this article discusses the seven principles which are implicit in
the American concept of popular sovereignty, and how the evolving nature of our
understanding of these principles has affected the interpretation of the Constitution
down to the present day.
I. THE MEANING OF “SOVEREIGNTY”
I use the term “sovereignty” to mean “the right to rule.”9 I refer to sovereignty
as a “right” because sovereignty is more than the mere possession or exercise of
power. When the people of a society regard their ruler as a sovereign, if that ruler

8

See Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 283 (2005)
[hereinafter Zick, Are the States Sovereign?] (noting that “[S]overeignty has never in fact
been the bright line Classicists embrace. It is, rather, a still-evolving concept that admits of
no easy definition.”).
9
See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 27 (2003) (stating, “When Americans
debated sovereignty before the Civil War, they were debating the ultimate locus of political
authority.”).
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is deposed the people still consider that person to be the rightful ruler.10 For that
reason, and not because of the former leader’s virtues or for reasons of political
expediency, the people may attempt to restore the former ruler to power. Sovereignty is a psychological and sociological determinant which affects the political life
of the nation.
People of different societies may profoundly disagree in their understanding of
where sovereignty resides. Over time and in different places people have held
wildly divergent opinions about the ultimate source of political power. People in
some societies have believed that the right to rule is determined by the will of God.11
In the past, monarchs rested their claim to power upon “the divine right of kings.”12
Even in the present day, the Saudi royal family and the Supreme Leader of Iran
contend that they are entitled to rule because they uniquely represent and defend
Islamic principles.13 In other societies sovereignty is thought to arise from superior
knowledge or adherence to a “true” political philosophy. For example, in some
countries the Communist Party has based its claim to the leading role in society14
upon the premise that it possesses a superior understanding of history and economics.15 In the United States, however, all just powers of government are derived
10

JOHN NEVILLE FIGGS, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 5–6 (2d ed. 1914); MORGAN, supra
note 2, at 18.
11
See FIGGS, supra note 10, at 5–6 (discussing the theory of the Divine Right of Kings).
12
See J. C. D. CLARKE, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1688–1832: RELIGION, IDEOLOGY AND
POLITICS DURING THE ANCIEN REGIME 86–87 (1985); MORGAN, supra note 2, at 18.
13
See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of
Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307, 364 (1994) (referring to
“Iran’s theocracy” and the fact that Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law endorses “the divine right of
Saudi kingship”); Neil Shevlin, Velayat-E Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: The
Implementation of Theocracy, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 358, 365 (1998) (describing the influence
of Ayatollah Khomeini’s teaching that “there should be no distinction between religion and
government in an Islamic state” on the Iranian Constitution).
14
See XIANFA pmbl. (2004) (China) (referring to “the people’s democratic dictatorship”
which in effect grants control to the Communist Party); JOSEONMINJUJU-UIINMINGONGHWAGUG SAHOEJU-UI HEONBEOB [Constitution] art. 12 (1998) (N. Korea) (“The
State shall adhere to the class line, strengthen the dictatorship of people’s democracy and
firmly defend the people’s power and socialist system against all subversive acts of hostile
elements at home and abroad.”); KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR
Constitution] art. 6 (“The leading and guiding force of the Soviet society and the nucleus of
its political system, of all state organisations and public organisations, is the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union.”).
15
See, e.g., VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.): REPORT ON
THE PARTY PROGRAMME (Mar. 19, 1919), reprinted in 3 V.I. LENIN: SELECTED WORKS 152
(1967) (“[A]ll countries are on the way from medievalism to bourgeois democracy or from
bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy. This is an absolutely inevitable course.”);
VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE: BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT
(1902), reprinted in 1 V. I. LENIN: SELECTED WORKS 104 (1967) (rejecting democratic
methods of reform in the belief that it would lead only to trade-unionism, and in particular
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“from the consent of the governed,”16 a principle which is known as “popular
sovereignty.”17 As mentioned above, Edmund Morgan has traced the growth and
development of the idea of popular sovereignty from its antecedents in England to
its ultimate acceptance at the founding of the United States.18
The term “sovereignty” has been the subject of much scholarly criticism.19 For
example, at the conclusion of a series of two articles perceptively critiquing how
courts and commentators have employed the concept of sovereignty, Professor Jack
N. Rakove states, “Sovereignty is too vague and anachronistic a term to allow us to
reason about anything more than our propensity to keep using it.”20
In one sense, Professor Rakove is right. The term “sovereignty” does not refer
to a definite legal formula which can be syllogistically applied to resolve specific
questions of law. However, even though sovereignty is not a precise legal doctrine,
I believe that Professor Rakove is wrong to dismiss the importance of the concept
of sovereignty, particularly with respect to constitutional analysis. Sovereignty is
a belief system; it is a psychological or sociological construct that represents a
society’s fundamental understanding of the proper source and allocation of political
power. In the United States, the sovereignty of the people comprehends a welter of
interlocking values which include the rule of law, limited government, personal
autonomy, the democratic process, the separation of church and state, the reserved
powers of the States, and national identity. Insofar as constitutional law represents
the sum and interplay of fundamental American political values, the concept of
popular sovereignty plays a valuable and important role in the interpretation of the
Constitution.

rejecting “freedom of criticism,” stating, “[t]hose who are really convinced that they have
made progress in science would not demand freedom for the new views to continue side by
side with the old, but the substitution of the new views for the old”); see also VLADIMIR
ILYICH LENIN, EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE R.C.P.(B.): REPORT ON THE PARTY
PROGRAMME (Mar. 18, 1919), reprinted in 29 V.I. LENIN: COLLECTED WORKS 151 (1965)
(threatening the middle peasants and the petty bourgeoisie that if they join forces with the
bourgeoisie, “we shall be obliged to apply the measures of the proletarian dictatorship to you,
too,”—that is, they “will be stood against the wall”).
16
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
17
Nathan Tarcov, Popular Sovereignty (In Democratic Political Theory), in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1426 (1986).
18
See generally MORGAN, supra note 2.
19
See Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 GREEN BAG 51 (1999).
20
Id. at 59, see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3
(1999) (referring to disagreement among scholars about the nature and significance of
sovereignty, and stating, “This muddle in part reflects the fact that the term ‘sovereignty’ has
been used in different ways. . . .”); id. (identifying four different categories of sovereignty
for purposes of international law: “international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty,
domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty”).
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Furthermore, because our society is organized on many levels, a theory of
sovereignty must be capable of explaining the allocation of power within and among
the different segments of society. It is unrealistic or at least anachronistic to speak
of sovereignty as if a single individual or institution might claim the right to exercise
all power within a society. Any theory of sovereignty must take into account the
allocation of political power among individuals, administrative agencies, political
subdivisions, the national government, foreign nations, and international bodies.
This article describes how the concept of popular sovereignty has affected the
interpretation of the Constitution in all of those various contexts.
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AT THE TIME OF THE FOUNDING AND IN THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD
Professor Morgan and other scholars have richly described how the concept of
popular sovereignty was germinated in the English Civil War and how it came to
fruition in America during and after the Stamp Act crisis of 1765.21 In the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, Parliament deposed James II and installed in his place William
III and Mary II;22 in the Declaration of Right of 1689, Parliament overthrew the
principle of the divine right of kings and declared itself sovereign.23 However, as
a practical matter Parliament did not exercise authority over the American
colonies.24 The charters of the American colonies had been granted by the King, and
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the colonies had grown accustomed
to governing themselves by means of elected colonial legislatures operating under
royal governors.25 Even after the Glorious Revolution, Parliament was largely
content to allow the King to rule the colonies in this manner.26 When Parliament
finally asserted itself in America in the 1760s by enacting unpopular laws such as
the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act, the colonists rebelled,27 asserting that Parliament
lacked the power to regulate or to tax them because the colonists were not repre-

21

See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 2, at 146–48.
See id. at 105–07 (describing the transfer).
23
See id. at 94–121 (describing the Glorious Revolution).
24
Id. at 122 (“[T]hose who settled England’s American colonies were building societies
where the authority of England’s king was ostensibly undiluted by his unruly English
Parliament.”).
25
See id. at 122–30 (describing the development of the colonial legislatures).
26
See id. at 145 (“As long as the system worked, both sides could and did take
considerable pride in it . . . .”).
27
See id. at 239 (“The Americans’ quarrel with England began, as everyone knows, with
the attempt of Parliament to levy taxes on the colonists in the Sugar Act of 1764 and the
Stamp Act of 1765.”).
22
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sented in Parliament.28 However, the colonists did not seek representation in
Parliament;29 instead they sought the freedom to make their own laws.30
The Americans and the British failed to compromise their differences over these
matters in part because they held incompatible understandings about the nature and
location of sovereignty.31 The British considered sovereignty to be a single, unitary
entity—the sole and original source of political power—and they thought that this
right to rule was incapable of being shared.32 According to Blackstone, there is in
every form of government “a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority,
in which . . . the rights of sovereignty, reside.”33 Originally, the British considered
that this unitary and absolute sovereign authority resided in the King; after the
Glorious Revolution, they believed it was vested in Parliament.34 After the Stamp
Act crisis of 1765, American colonists came to believe that sovereignty rested with
the people rather than Parliament,35 but there was another even more significant
28

See id. at 213 (“Boston led the way in May 1764 when Samuel Adams opened his
public career as a revolutionary by drafting instructions for the Boston representatives,
denouncing the levying of taxes on colonies by Parliament.”); id. at 231 (“When Parliament
undertook in the 1760s and 1770s to bind the colonists with legislation contrary to their
wishes, the colonists had ready-made representative bodies to challenge the credentials of
an English House of Commons to speak for them.”); see also Circular Letter from the SelectMen of Boston to the Gentlemen Select-Men of Charlestown (Sept. 14, 1876), available at
http://www.masshist.org/revolution/doc-viewer.php?item_id=259&mode=nav. (“Taxes
equally detrimental to the Commercial interests of the Parent Country and her Colonies, are
imposed upon the People, without their Consent . . . .”).
29
See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 242 (“It was not that the colonists themselves wished
to be represented in Parliament.”).
30
See id. at 243 (“[T]hey were affirming, without at first being fully aware of what they
were doing, that the American colonies were different national communities from the one
that was represented in Parliament.”).
31
See John V. Jezierski, Parliament or People: James Wilson and Blackstone on the
Nature and Location of Sovereignty, 32 J. HIST. IDEAS 95–100 (1971).
32
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *48–49 (asserting that in every form
of government there is “[A] supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which
. . . the rights of sovereignty, reside . . . . By the sovereign power . . . is meant the making of
laws . . . .”); id. at *156–57 (arguing against lodging sovereignty in the people as a whole,
and stating, “the power of parliament is absolute and without control”); see also JEFFREY
GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 1–8 (1999)
(describing the history of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty from the thirteenth
century onward, and defending the principle of parliamentary supremacy).
33
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *48–49.
34
See FOUNDING AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS
xii (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 2006) (“Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Parliament had
been recognized as the sovereign source of law within Britain.”).
35
See id. (“[T]he Revolution really began in the mid-1760s, when the colonists first
argued that Parliament had no authority to impose taxes or other laws on a people who sent
no representatives of their own to distant London.”); see also Jezierski, supra note 31, at 106.
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difference between the British and American conceptions of sovereignty. Americans held a much more complex understanding of the notion of sovereignty than did
the British. This multi-faceted American conception of popular sovereignty is
described in the following section.
A. Popular Sovereignty at the Time of the Founding
The second sentence of the Declaration of Independence36 announces the
fundamental principle that “all Men are created equal.”37 This statement had two
important implications for Americans of the founding generation. First, no individual, at birth, is entitled to possess more political power than any other individual.
Accordingly, Americans were rejecting not only the divine right of kings, but the
entire institution of the aristocracy. The second immediate implication of the phrase
“all Men are created equal” was that the American people are equal to the British
people, and that as “one People”38 Americans were ready to assume their “separate
and equal Station”39 among the nations of the world. To the founders, equality
meant both individual freedom and national independence.
The second sentence of the Declaration also expresses the principle that all
persons “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”40 This is
not a mere sentiment; to the contrary, it was the sole justification offered for the
institution of government: “to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among Men.”41
36

37
38

39
40
41

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration states:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That
to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends,
it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing
its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.
Id.
Id. at para. 1. The Declaration states:
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and
equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of nature’s God entitle
them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.
Id.
Id. para. 2.
Id.
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Finally, the second sentence of the Declaration expressly declares the principle
of popular sovereignty: All “just Powers” of government are “deriv[ed] . . . from the
Consent of the Governed.”42 The founders described the circumstances under which
people have the right to form a new government:
[W]henever any form of Government becomes destructive of
these Ends [to secure the people’s rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness], it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form,
as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.43
The founders claimed that the systematic deprivation of the colonists’ rights by the
British Parliament and King justified the Revolution.
The final paragraph of the Declaration44 constitutes an act of popular sovereignty. The act of declaring independence is taken “in the Name, and by Authority
of the good People of these Colonies.”45
By declaring the former colonies to be “Free and Independent States,”46 this
final paragraph also lays the foundation for the principle of “state sovereignty.”
This paragraph refers to the “united States of America,”47 (the word “united” is not
capitalized) and throughout the paragraph the colonies and states are referred to in

42
43
44

45
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id. para. 32. The Declaration states:
WE, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of
America, in General Congres, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme
Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in the Name,
and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly
Publish and Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right
ought to be, Free and Independent States; that they are absolved from
all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political Connection
between them and the State of Great-Britain, is and ought to be totally
dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full
Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent
States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a
firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually
pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the plural form.48 The obvious implication is that the states are separate entities, not
merely part of a larger national entity.
Following the Revolution, Americans initially adopted a form of government
which recognized each state as sovereign. The first Constitution for the United
States of America was the Articles of Confederation, a “firm league of friendship”
among the several states.49 It was entitled a confederation between the states,50 and,
pursuant to its terms, the representatives to the Continental Congress voted as
states.51 The central government was relatively weak; the Articles make no provision for a separate executive or judicial branch of government,52 nor was Congress
given any power to impose direct taxes or regulate commerce among the states.53
Furthermore, the Articles expressly provided that “[E]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which
is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled.”54
There are elements of the Articles of Confederation that militate against the
concept of “state sovereignty.” The name of the country was now the “United States
of America”—unlike in the Declaration, the word “United” was capitalized,55 thus
implying that the United States was a single entity. The Articles impose a number
of limitations on the states; limitations that are inconsistent with full sovereignty.
For example, the states were forbidden to enter into treaties or engage in war
without the consent of Congress.56 Most significantly, the Articles of Confederation
were expressly made “perpetual.”57
48

See id. (stating in reference to the colonies that “they are absolved from all Allegiance
to the British Crown,” that the political connection between “them” and the State of Great
Britain is dissolved, and in reference to the states, that “they have full Power to levy War,
conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things
which Independent States may of right do”).
49
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. III.
50
Id. (entitled, “[The] Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States
of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.”).
51
See id. at art. V, § 4 (providing that “each [s]tate shall have one vote”).
52
See id. at art. IX, § 5 (providing for the appointment of a “Committee of the States” to
exercise executive-like powers); id. at art. IX, § 2 (authorizing Congress to resolve disputes
among the states).
53
See id. at art. IX, §§ 4–5.
54
Id. at art. II.
55
Id. at art. I.
56
See id. at art. VI § 1, § 5.
57
Id. at art. XIII (“And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed
by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter
be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United
States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”).
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However, the American people soon wearied of the “league of friendship” that
was the Articles of Confederation,58 and in 1788 they ratified the present Constitution of the United States.59 The Constitution differs from the Articles of Confederation in several fundamental respects that pertain to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. First, unlike the Articles, the Constitution is “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]”
by the “People of the United States,”60 not by the States. Second, the Constitution
is intended to be “a more perfect Union” than the Confederation.61 Third, the
Constitution is expressly created by the people for the purpose of “secur[ing] the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”62 Fourth, the Constitution
provides that it is “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”63 Fifth, and most significantly, there is no reference to the
sovereignty of the states in the Constitution. In sum, the Constitution is a much
closer approximation of popular sovereignty than the Articles of Confederation.
B. Popular Sovereignty in the Conflict Over Slavery—a “People’s Contest”
During the antebellum period, the controversy over slavery rose to a crescendo,
tearing this nation apart.64 To a surprising extent, the debate was framed in terms
of “sovereignty,” but “sovereignty” appeared in several guises. It is common
knowledge how the principle of “state sovereignty” was utilized in support of
slavery to justify nullification and secession,65 and how Daniel Webster rebutted
those arguments in his Second Reply to Hayne66 and the Seventh of March Speech.67
58

Id. at art. III.
MARC LANDRY & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: BALANCING
DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS 39 (2d ed. 2008).
60
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
64
See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE ILLUSTRATED BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL
WAR ERA 65–82 (2003).
65
See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. TO THE S.C. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (THE
S.C. EXPOSITION) (1828), as reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 531–33
(Clyde N. Wilson & W. Edwin Hemphill eds., 1977) (arguing in favor of interposition and
state nullification of federal law); Senator John C. Calhoun, Final Remarks to the Senate of
South Carolina, A Warning to the North (Mar. 4, 1850), reprinted in THE CAUSES OF THE
CIVIL WAR 40–45 (Kenneth M. Stampp, ed., 3d rev. ed. 1991) (warning that Northern
hostility to slavery would lead to disunion).
66
Daniel Webster, Second Reply to Hayne (Jan. 26–27, 1830), reprinted in DANIEL
WEBSTER: “THE COMPLETEST MAN” 113–20 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker ed. 1999) (closing
with the words, “[l]iberty and Union, now and for ever, one and inseparable!”).
67
Daniel Webster, Seventh of March Speech (Mar. 7, 1850), reprinted in DANIEL
59
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Less familiar is how the principle of “popular sovereignty” was employed both in
support of and in opposition to slavery.
The term “popular sovereignty” was the slogan that Stephen Douglas used to
justify the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 which authorized each new state to decide
whether it would enter the Union as a slave or as a free state.68 Douglas gave the
following explanation for having sponsored this law: “My object was to secure the
right of the people of each State and of each Territory, North or South, to decide the
question for themselves, to have slavery or not, just as they chose . . . .”69 Douglas,
of course, did not believe that African-Americans should have a voice in the matter.
Instead, he understood popular sovereignty to mean government “by the white man,
for the benefit of the white man, to be administered by white men, in such manner
as they should determine.”70
In 1857 the Supreme Court decided Dred Scott v. Sandford,71 which struck
down the Missouri Compromise that had excluded slavery from the northern portion
of the American territories. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney
stated that “the people of the United States” are the political body who “form the
sovereignty,” and noted that the central question in the case was whether blacks
“compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty.”72 Invoking the interpretive principle of original intent, Taney concluded:
We think they are not [included within “the people of the United
States”], and that they are not included, and were not intended
to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution,
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which
that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United
States.73
Abraham Lincoln refuted both Douglas and Taney in their assertions that blacks
possessed neither individual nor political sovereignty. On October 16, 1854, in his

WEBSTER: “THE COMPLETEST MAN,” supra note 66, at 121 (ridiculing the idea of
“[p]eaceable secession! Peaceable secession!”).
68
Speech of Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Remarks to Public Reception in Chicago (July
9, 1858), in POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HON. STEPHEN A.
DOUGLAS IN THE CELEBRATED CAMPAIGN OF 1858, at 5 (Columbus, Follett, Foster & Co.
1860) [hereinafter Douglas, Speech].
69
Id. at 8.
70
Id. at 15.
71
60 U.S. 393 (1857) (finding that blacks, whether slave or free, were not citizens of the
United States).
72
Id. at 404.
73
Id.; see also Douglas, Speech, supra note 68, at 21 (agreeing with Taney’s assessment).

2010]

CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

13

famous speech at Peoria, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln responded to Douglas’s statement that the principle of self-government was not applicable to blacks:
The doctrine of self-government is right—absolutely and
eternally right—but it has no just application, as here attempted.
Or perhaps I should rather say that whether it has such just
application depends upon whether a negro is not or is a man. If
he is not a man, why in that case, he who is a man may, as a
matter of self-government, do just as he pleases with him. But
if the negro is a man, is it not to that extent, a total destruction
of self-government, to say that he too shall not govern himself?
When the white man governs himself that is self-government;
but when he governs himself, and also governs another man,
that is more than self-government—that is despotism. If the
negro is a man, why then my ancient faith teaches me that “all
men are created equal;” and that there can be no moral right in
connection with one man’s making a slave of another.74
Lincoln then drew a direct link between popular sovereignty and individual
sovereignty:
[N]o man is good enough to govern another man, without that
other’s consent. I say this is the leading principle—the sheet
anchor of American republicanism. Our Declaration of Independence says:
“We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.”75
Lincoln then took one more step in defining the relation between individual
sovereignty and popular sovereignty. He asserted that, because no man has the
power to govern another man without that other’s consent, it follows that the law
must also treat all men equally and allow every person an equal voice in the government:
74

Abraham Lincoln, Peoria Speech (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note
1, at 265–66 [hereinafter Lincoln, Peoria].
75
Id. at 266.
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I have quoted so much at this time merely to show that
according to our ancient faith, the just powers of governments
are derived from the consent of the governed. Now the relation
of masters and slaves is, pro tanto, a total violation of this principle. The master not only governs the slave without his consent;
but he governs him by a set of rules altogether different from
those which he prescribes for himself. Allow all the governed
an equal voice in the government, and that, and that only is self
government.76
According to Abraham Lincoln, the principles of liberty, equality, and selfgovernment are not competing principles; instead, they are mutually-reinforcing
aspects of the same underlying truth. Stephen Douglas may have appropriated the
term “popular sovereignty,” but Lincoln embodied it.
In his speech on June 16, 1857, Lincoln responded to Taney’s and Douglas’s
assertions that the framers intended to exclude blacks from the phrase “all men are
created equal.”77 Lincoln noted that the Declaration was clear on this point—that
Taney and Douglas were “doing . . . obvious violence to the plain unmistakable
language of the Declaration.”78 He noted that the framers “defined with tolerable
distinctness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal—equal in
‘certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ This they said, and this meant.”79 He then explained why the framers wrote
the Declaration so broadly as to include the entire human family:
They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which
should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked
to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly
attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the
happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.80
Four years later, at the commencement of the Civil War, Lincoln once again
invoked the principle of popular sovereignty, this time in opposition to secession.81
76

Id.
Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (June 16, 1857), in 2
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 405–06.
78
Id. at 405.
79
Id. at 405–06.
80
Id. at 406.
81
President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—First Edition & Revisions (Mar.
77
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Lincoln believed that people have a right to revolution, but it is not a legal right. It
is, instead, a moral right, and their right to rebel or secede thus depends upon the
legitimacy of the cause for which they are fighting.82 Slavery, of course, was an
unjust cause.83 Nor could the people of any democracy claim to have a legitimate
right to secede simply because they had lost an election; to accept such a proposition
meant that democracy itself was impossible. Lincoln explained this principle in his
address to Congress on July 4, 1861:
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United
States. It presents to the whole family of man, the question,
whether a constitutional republic, or a democracy—a government of the people, by the same people—can, or cannot, maintain its territorial integrity, against its own domestic foes. It
presents the question, whether discontented individuals, too few
in numbers to control administration, according to organic law,
in any case, can always, upon the pretences made in this case, or
on any other pretences, or arbitrarily, without any pretence,
break up their Government, and thus practically put an end to
free government upon the earth.84
In this speech Lincoln argued forcefully and at length against the notion of state
“sovereignty”85 and the legality of secession.86 He specifically contrasted the
4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 253.
82
President Abraham Lincoln, Address to Congress (July 4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 1, at 434 n.83 [hereinafter Lincoln, Congress] (“The right of revolution,
is never a legal right. The very term implies the breaking, and not the abiding by, organic
law. At most, it is but a moral right, when exercised for a morally justifiable cause. When
exercised without such a cause revolution is no right, but simply a wicked exercise of
physical power.”).
83
Lincoln, Peoria, supra note 74, at 266 (“there can be no moral right in connection with
one man’s making a slave of another”).
84
Lincoln, Congress, supra note 82, at 426.
85
Id. at 434. Lincoln stated:
Much is said about the “sovereignty” of the States; but the word, even,
is not in the national Constitution; nor, as is believed, in any of the
State constitutions. What is a “sovereignty,” in the political sense of the
term? Would it be far wrong to define it “A political community,
without a political superior”? Tested by this, no one of our States,
except Texas, ever was a sovereignty. And even Texas gave up the
character on coming into the Union; by which act, she acknowledged
the Constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties of the
United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, to be, for her, the
supreme law of the land.
Id.
86
See id. at 434–40 (contending that secession is not permitted under the Constitution).
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Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the Union to the Declaration and
Constitution of the Confederacy:
Our adversaries have adopted some Declarations of Independence; in which, unlike the good old one, penned by Jefferson,
they omit the words “all men are created equal.” Why? They
have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble
of which, unlike our good old one, signed by Washington, they
omit “We, the People,” and substitute “We, the deputies of the
sovereign and independent States.” Why? Why this deliberate
pressing out of view, the rights of men, and the authority of the
people?87
Ultimately, Lincoln said, the Civil War was “a People’s contest” that was being
waged to defend fundamental human rights:
This is essentially a People’s contest. On the side of the
Union, it is a struggle for maintaining in the world, that form,
and substance of government, whose leading object is, to elevate
the condition of men—to lift artificial weights from all shoulders—to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all—to afford all,
an unfettered start, and a fair chance, in the race of life.88
Lincoln’s understanding of the Declaration led him to the conclusion that
popular sovereignty is not limited to the right to vote—and certainly not limited to
one race of man. It is instead a complex amalgam of interlocking and mutually
supporting values.
I suggest that popular sovereignty comprises at least seven separate ideals: the
rule of law, limited government, individual rights, equal political rights, separation
of church and state, limited state sovereignty, and national sovereignty. These
principles, and the complex relation among them, are described below.
III. SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ARISING FROM THE CONCEPT OF
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
A. The Rule of Law
The first aspect of constitutional law that is derived from the principle of
popular sovereignty is simply that the Constitution is law: it is law because the
87
88

Id. at 438.
Id.
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people have the original right to create law,89 and the Constitution is just such a
constituent act.90
Not only is the Constitution a law, it is also “a superior, paramount law.”91
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution expressly provides that the Constitution is
“the supreme law of the land,”92 thus placing the Constitution at the pinnacle of the
hierarchy of American law. This hierarchy is made necessary by the fact that the
American people have distributed power among different branches and levels of
government. The people have created a national government as well as individual
states; in addition, there are legislative branches that enact statutes and ratify
treaties, executive branch agencies that issue regulations under the authority of
statutes, and courts that create the common law as well as interpret the written law.
The hierarchy of American law is as follows:
United States Constitution

9

Treaties—Federal Statutes

9

Federal Regulations

9

Federal Common Law

9

State Constitutions

9

State Regulations

9

State Common Law

89

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (“That the people
have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected.”).
90
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of the United States . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. 304, 328 (1816) (stating that the Constitution “is the voice of the whole American
people . . .”).
91
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (“The constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like
other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.”); id. (“Certainly all those
who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must
be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.”).
92
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Obedience to the law is simply adherence to the will of the people—what
Rousseau called submission to the “general will.”93 At the beginning of his legal
and political career, Abraham Lincoln urged Americans to make obedience of the
law a “political religion”:
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher to
his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to
violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never
to tolerate their violation by others. . . . Let reverence for the
laws . . . . become the political religion of the nation . . . .94
Arguably the greatest challenge to the supremacy of the Constitution and the
authority of the Supreme Court during the 20th century was the Little Rock school
desegregation case, Cooper v. Aaron.95 After the Little Rock School Board adopted
a limited plan to integrate the city’s Central High School, the Governor of Arkansas
called out the National Guard to prevent black students from entering the school.96
The Governor’s action was in direct defiance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education,97 and it increased public hostility to the integration
plan.98 When the Guard withdrew and the black children again attempted to attend
the school, they had to be withdrawn because of what the Supreme Court called a
“large and demonstrating crowd,”99 and what Peter Irons describes as “howling
mobs” of “racial bigots” who “circled the school.”100 In Cooper, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Brown and declared that obedience to the Constitution is “indispensable
for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of

93

See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 81 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
1968) (1762).
94
Abraham Lincoln, Address to Young Men’s Lyceum (Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 1, at 112.
95
358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering the Little Rock School Board to desegregate the city’s
schools).
96
See id. at 11 (“On the morning of . . . September 4, 1957, the Negro children attempted
to enter the high school but, as the District Court later found, units of the Arkansas National
Guard ‘acting pursuant to the Governor’s order, stood shoulder to shoulder at the school
grounds and thereby forcibly prevented the 9 Negro students . . . from entering,’ as they
continued to do every school day during the following three weeks.”).
97
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official racial segregation of the public schools).
98
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10 (“from that date [of the Governor’s action] hostility to the Plan
was increased . . . [and became] more bitter and unrestrained”).
99
Id. at 12.
100
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1955, 250 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993).
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us.”101 The Court added “[o]ur constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus
made a living truth.”102
The Rule of Law binds not only the states and the political branches of the
federal government, but the courts as well. Once the Supreme Court has taken a
position on a fundamental point of constitutional law, it is reluctant to overturn such
a decision in the absence of special circumstances.103 In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,104 Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter jointly authored a plurality opinion in which they
considered whether to reaffirm or overturn Roe v. Wade.105 They stated that if the
Court were to overrule Roe simply because of popular opposition to the decision it
would “seriously weaken . . . the rule of law.”106 They explained that people’s
acceptance of their decisions was dependent upon the belief that the Court’s rulings
were “grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political
pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is
obliged to make.”107 The Justices contended that the doctrine of stare decisis applies
with even stronger force “whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution
calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,” as it had in Roe.108 The
101

Cooper, 358 U.S. at 20.
Id.
103
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (O’Connor,
J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J., plurality opinion) (identifying four factors that should be
taken into account in determining whether to reaffirm or overrule a previous constitutional
decision). The plurality stated that in making this determination it was appropriate to
consider:
[W]hether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling
and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles
of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than
a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.
Id. (citations omitted).
104
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (reaffirming the central holding of Roe v. Wade).
105
410 U.S. 113 (establishing the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy prior to
viability of the fetus).
106
Casey, 505 U.S. at 865 (1992) (O’Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J., plurality
opinion) (“[O]verruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result
under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise
the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of
law.”).
107
Id. at 865–66.
108
Id. at 867.
102
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Justices offered two examples of cases where the Court had been justified in overruling major precedent: West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,109 overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,110 and Brown v. Board of Education,111 overruling Plessy v. Ferguson.112 In each of those cases the Court came to the belief that the factual premises
of the prior decision simply were not true; changes in fact or changes in understandings of fact necessitated a change in the interpretation of the Constitution.113
In the field of constitutional law the principle of the Rule of Law demands not
only the obedience of the citizenry, executive officers, and legislative bodies to the
dictates of the Constitution, but also the willingness of the Supreme Court to accord
appropriate respect to previous interpretations of the Constitution, particularly
decisions that purport to settle national controversies.
B. Limited Government
The second corollary that is derived from the axiom that the people are sovereign is that the government is not sovereign. In the United States, the people do not
serve the government; rather, the government serves the people.114 In Marbury v.
Madison,115 the foundation case in constitutional law, Chief Justice John Marshall
asked, “Is it to be contended that the heads of departments are not amenable to the
laws of their country?”116 His answer, of course, was that public officials are subject
to the law: “The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men.”117 The Court in Marbury found that even the
President is under the law.118 The Court stated that in adopting the Constitution the
109

300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law).
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum wage law).
111
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official segregation of the public schools).
112
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state law requiring the segregation of the races in
railroad cars).
113
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–64 (discussing the overruling of Plessy and Adkins); id. at
863 (“West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts,
changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional
resolutions.”).
114
See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (Statement of Rep. James Madison: “If we advert
to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the
people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”).
115
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the principle that laws that are in conflict
with the Constitution are void).
116
Id. at 164.
117
Id. at 163.
118
Id. at 167 (ruling that if a public official has been appointed for a term of years and
there is no provision permitting his removal by the President, then the President has no power
to remove that official). The Court stated:
If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the President, then a
new appointment may be immediately made, and the rights of the
110
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people of the United States not only created a government, but they had placed upon
that government “certain limits not to be transcended.”119
Over time, the general powers of the federal government have greatly expanded,
typically during times of great crisis: the Civil War,120 the Great Depression,121 and
the Civil Rights Movement.122 The people have approved this expansion by repeatedly enacting amendments to the Constitution vesting power in Congress to enact
“appropriate legislation”123—a process that James McPherson refers to as the
promotion of “positive liberty.”124 However, the Constitution still constrains the
government in the exercise of those powers.125

officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made
never to have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated; and
consequently if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the
President; the rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are
not resumable by the President.
Id. at 167.
See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ordering President Nixon to turn
over the Watergate Tapes); Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(declaring President Truman’s seizure of the steel industry unconstitutional).
119
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176. “This original and supreme will organizes the government, and
assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish
certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The government of the United
States is of the latter description.” Id.
120
See David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2006)
(describing the far-reaching legislation enacted by Congress during the Civil War, and
stating, “the nonmilitary legislation of the Civil War years also reflected a veritable
revolution in the understanding of federal authority”).
121
See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1253–62 (describing the expansion of federal power during the New Deal and the
Supreme Court’s response).
122
See id. at 1272–78 (describing expansion of regulatory power as a result of Great
Society programs).
123
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XII, §2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, §2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; U.S.
Const. amend XIX; U.S. Const. amend. XXIII. §2; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, §2; U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, §2 (granting Congress the power to enforce the amendment by
appropriate legislation).
124
JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 62–63, 137–38 (1991) (drawing the distinction between “positive liberty” and
“negative liberty,” and defining “positive liberty” as “freedom to achieve a status of freedom
previously denied by disability or law”). But see DAVID KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC
ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, 481–83 (1996) (criticizing the
Roosevelt administration for failing to secure a constitutional amendment expanding
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause).
125
See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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An important feature of “limited government” under the Constitution is the
doctrine of Separation of Powers, which safeguards freedom by dividing governmental power into different functions and distributing these functions among
competing branches of the government.126 As Madison says in The Federalist No.
51, to prevent tyranny “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.”127 Louis
Brandeis echoed this view in his dissenting opinion in Myers v. United States,128
where he stated:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.129
Similarly, Justice Anthony Kennedy has stated that “[l]iberty is always at stake . .
. [in] the separation of powers.”130
The doctrine of Separation of Powers is of greatest importance in situations
where the country faces a crisis and the people are tempted to address the crisis by
concentrating governmental power in one branch or public officer. For example,
over the years both the President and Congress have sought to control government
spending by having one government official or institution assume responsibility for
balancing the budget.131 However, the Supreme Court has ruled that neither the
President, nor the Congress, nor both branches acting together have the authority to
alter the Constitutional allocation of powers in this regard. In Train v. New York,
126

But see Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly
Effected A Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689 (2006) (arguing that over
the past few decades the doctrine of separation of powers “has worked to shift power from
Congress to the federal judiciary”).
127
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 246 (James Madison) (David Wooten ed., 2003); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 232 (James Madison) (David Wooten ed., 2003) (“The
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
128
272 U.S. 52 (1926) (ruling that the President has the exclusive power to remove
officials appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate).
129
Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
130
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
Constitution’s structure requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment.
The latter premise, too, is flawed. Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the
branches seek to transgress the separation of powers.”) (citations omitted).
131
See, e.g., Richard A. Gephardt, The Congressional Budget Impasse, 16 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 5 (1996) (describing the history behind and the events of the 1995–96 budget
impasse).
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the Court ruled that the President lacked statutory authority to impound funds to
reduce the deficit;132 in Bowsher v. Synar, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress
could not confer the power to balance the budget on the Comptroller General, an
official within the legislative branch;133 and in Clinton v. New York, the Court ruled
that Congress could not vest the power of the line item veto in the President.134
These measures might have proven useful or efficient, but the Court ruled that they
were inconsistent with the system of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution.
In times of war the country faces even graver dangers, and people’s fear may
lead them to approve extraordinary measures. The Alien and Sedition Act adopted
during the “silent war” with France;135 the decisions of military commanders under
Lincoln to close newspapers or imprison civilians accused of aiding the Confederacy;136 the enactment and enforcement of the Espionage Act during World War I;137
the internment of Japanese-American citizens and resident aliens during World War
II;138 the President’s seizure of the steel industry during the Korean conflict;139 and
the surveillance of antiwar groups during the Vietnam War140 were all challenged
132

420 U.S. 35 (1975) (striking down the President’s impoundment of funds allocated to
the Environmental Protection Agency).
133
478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
134
524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down the Line Item Veto Act).
135
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (“[T]he great controversy
over the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . first crystallized a national awareness of the central
meaning of the First Amendment.”); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S
DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY
52–117 (2000) (describing the adoption, enforcement, and reaction to the Alien and Sedition
Acts); Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939 (2009)
(describing limitations on freedom of speech during war at different times in American
history); id. at 941–42 (discussing Alien and Sedition Acts).
136
See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 2 (1866) (striking down a person’s conviction
in military court for conspiring to overthrow the government, on the ground that the civil
courts were open); CURTIS, supra note 135, at 306–09 (describing measures taken during the
Civil War to stifle dissent); Stone, supra note 135, at 942–44.
137
See Stone, supra note 135, at 944–46 (describing the Espionage and Sedition Acts).
138
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding order excluding
persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast during World War II); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215 (1995) (stating that the Court in Korematsu had
“inexplicably” upheld the exclusion order, and quoting Justice Murphy’s dissent
characterizing the order as the product of “racism”).
139
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down
action of the President taking control of the nation’s steel industry during the Korean War).
140
See INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: FINAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk.2, at 10–15 (1976) (describing the F.B.I.’s
COINTELPRO program and its concerted effort to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.);
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as unconstitutional, and in each instance the eventual judgment of history has been
harsh.141 In the course of the present War on Terror, lawyers for the Justice Department claimed extraordinary power for the President to detain prisoners without trial
and subject them to cruel methods of interrogation.142 In four cases decided in the
past six years, the Supreme Court has ruled against the government and determined
that suspected terrorists are entitled to fair hearings to determine their status and
their guilt.143 As Justice Robert Jackson stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer:
The purpose of lodging dual titles [President and Commander in
Chief] in one man was to insure that the civilian would control
the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the presidential office. No penance would ever expiate the sin against
free government of holding that a President can escape control
of executive powers by law through assuming his military
role.144
The lesson is clear: even in time of war, the government is constrained by law.
C. Inalienable Rights
Stone, supra note 135, at 951–52; see also Jonathan D. Forgang, Note, “The Right of the
People”: The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
of Americans Overseas, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 234 (2009) (summarizing facts leading
to adoption of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978).
141
See supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text.
142
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of
the Central Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002) available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/nation/pdf/OfficeofLegalCounsel_Aug2Memo_041609.pdf (approving
waterboarding, confinement of a prisoner in a small dark box with insects, and sleep
deprivation, among other techniques); see also Wilson Huhn, Waterboarding Is Illegal,
WASH. U. L. REV. COMMENTARIES (May 10, 2008), http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slipopinions/waterboarding-is-illegal/; see generally Wilson Huhn Treatment of Detainees,
WILSON HUHN: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, https://sites.google.com/site/
huhnconstitutionallaw/discussion/treatment-of-detainees (last visited Oct. 2, 2010)
(collecting documents).
143
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) (finding prisoner status hearings and
appeal mechanism in Military Commissions Act not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus
proceedings); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (finding that procedures in war
crimes trials before military commissions fell short of requirements under Geneva
Convention and Uniform Code of Military Justice); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(finding Due Process Clause applicable to prisoner status hearings); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004) (finding that federal district court has jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
proceeding involving prisoner held in Guantanamo).
144
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646.
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Even though the people have the right to create a government and to invest it
with various powers, our constitutional system also assumes that individuals retain
an irreducible portion of sovereignty, their inalienable rights. As Alexander Bickel
noted, this involves a contradiction: how is it possible that the actions of a popularly
elected government founded upon the principle of popular sovereignty can be
constrained by the decisions of an unelected judiciary?145 The answer, of course, is
that the people also expect the Constitution to protect them in the exercise of their
inalienable rights.
The theory of the social contract assumes that government arises from the
consent of sovereign individuals: in a state of nature, each person has the right to do
with himself as he pleases, but in joining or remaining in a society, a person agrees
to cede some of his natural sovereignty to the rulers of the community.146 The
essential question is, in entering into the social contract, how much sovereignty must
each person give up?147
Thomas Hobbes believed that individuals grant virtually all power to government.148 Hobbes, a product of the English Civil War, feared political and social
145

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
(1962) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional
a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of
the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing
majority, but against it.”); id. at 16 (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system.”).
146
See generally THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 81–86 (A.R. Waller ed., 1904)
(1651). Hobbes described man’s condition in a state of nature as constant warfare—the life
of man is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Id. at 84; see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 101–06 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003) (1690) (discussing the state of
nature); ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 64–65 (explaining the change from the state of nature
to civil society).
147
See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
1, 39 (1999) (summarizing the uses of social contract theory in American case law, and
concluding that social contract theory is ambiguous on the question of the proper balance
between governmental power and individual rights). Professor Allen states:
Social contract theory is too flexible to point with certainty in any one
direction, particularly where the right answer is a matter of
controversy, and particularly in the absence of detailed argument and
analysis of the sort associated with the discipline of academic
philosophy rather than the pragmatic discipline of law. As the
examples of flexibility cited throughout this article show, using the
apparatus of social contract theory, one can make the case for
individual rights against government and likewise the case for
government authority over individuals.
Id.
148
See HOBBES, supra note 146, at 120.
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17
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discord and was willing to trade liberty for security.149 The Framers of our Constitution instead took inspiration from John Locke, a child of the Glorious Revolution,150
who maintained that people are possessed of natural rights—rights that cannot be
waived because they are inherent.151 The Declaration of Independence expressly
adopts Locke’s position, stating that each person is endowed with “certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”152
Furthermore, unlike Hobbes, the founders of our country believed that the purpose
of government was not to prevent discord, but to preserve freedom; the Declaration
expressly states that the purpose of government is “to secure these Rights,”153 and
the Constitution provides that one of its purposes is to “secure the blessings of
liberty.”154
In the 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,155 the Supreme Court explained the
relationship between the sovereignty of the government and the sovereignty of the
149

See Gregory H. Fox, Strengthening the State, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 42
(1999) (“The great theorists of State consolidation, such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin,
wrote of domestic absolutism as a necessary response to conditions of pervasive disorder;
the English civil war in the case of Hobbes and the continental religious wars for Bodin.”).
150
See Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L.
REV. 525, 531 (2007). Professor Gaba states:
In 1690, after a return from exile in Holland following the
successful “Glorious Revolution,” Locke published the Two Treatises
of Government, his extraordinarily influential work of political
philosophy. Although there is some dispute over when each part was
drafted, the basic purposes of the Two Treatises—a refutation of the
power of the monarchy, a description of the legitimate basis for
democratic government and a justification for revolution against
illegitimate government—were closely tied to the currents of
revolution that culminated in William and Mary’s ascension to the
throne.
Id.
151
See id. at 579. Gaba states:
John Locke, political philosopher and all around polymath, stands
as a central figure in the development of Western conceptions of
property rights and democratic institutions. If not the sole voice that is
echoed in the American revolution and the Constitutional Convention,
he clearly influenced the founders, particularly James Madison, and he
thus represents an intellectual force that is a legitimate part of the
current debate over the relationship between government power and
individual property rights.
Id.
152
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
153
Id.
154
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
155
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down the refusal of municipal authorities to allow
persons of Chinese ancestry to operate laundries).
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individual.156 While the people as a whole are sovereign,157 the rights to “life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” are “individual possessions” which are
“secured by . . . maxims of constitutional law.”158
After 1937, the Supreme Court turned from the protection of property rights to
the protection of personal rights, greatly expanding the number and scope of civil
rights in myriad fields of constitutional law:159 procedural fairness,160 equal protection,161 freedom of expression,162 and freedom of religion.163 As Justice Jackson
stated in 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:164
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.165

156

Id. at 369–70 (“When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of
their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for
the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.”).
157
Id. at 370 (“Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and
source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts.”).
158
Id.
159
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 263 (1993) (stating that
the Warren Court “rewrote much of the corpus of American constitutional law.”); Wilson R.
Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, 2 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter
Huhn, Roosevelt Court] (describing the achievements of the Roosevelt Court).
160
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (extending the right of procedural
due process to the termination of welfare benefits by an administrative agency).
161
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official
segregation of the public schools).
162
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (imposing “actual malice”
test and other requirements in libel actions brought by public officials on account of
statements regarding their official duties).
163
See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down
state law requiring the reading of Bible verses in the public schools).
164
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down children’s suspension from public school for
refusing to salute the American flag).
165
Id. at 638.
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In recent decades the Supreme Court has been particularly active in recognizing
different facets of the right to privacy, which it has described as the right of the
individual to make “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”166 In 2003 the Court stated:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.167
Another specific right that the Court has recognized that is a direct consequence
of the concept of individual sovereignty is the right of the individual to participate
in the political process on an equal basis with other persons.
D. Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule
The fourth idea that emerges from the principle of popular sovereignty is that
because every individual is a sovereign political actor, each individual therefore has
an equal right to participate in the political process. Accordingly, the Constitution
protects freedom of political expression,168 freedom of political association,169 and
the equal right to vote.170 In addition, the idea that each person possesses an equal
amount of sovereignty is the foundation for the principle of majority rule.171
By declaring that “all men are created equal,” the founders of this country
rejected the concept that private individuals were entitled to exercise a hereditary

166

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa, v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
168
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (overturning jury verdict
against newspaper that ran advertisement from civil rights organization describing police
treatment of civil rights demonstrators).
169
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (striking down state court order
requiring NAACP to disclose names of members).
170
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down malapportionment of
state legislative districts).
171
See Amar, Central Meaning, supra note 7, at 749 (“The central pillar of Republican
Government, I claim, is popular sovereignty.”); id. at 757 (“this linkage between
Republicanism and majority rule runs throughout The Federalist Papers, and Founding era
discourse . . . .”); id. at 753, 762–66 (citing James Madison, James Wilson, Alexander
Hamilton, and other founders on the central importance of majority rule).
167

2010]

CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

29

form of political power.172 The Enlightenment ideal of popular sovereignty represented a break from the feudal concept of hereditary entitlement. Article I, Section
9 of the Constitution prohibits the federal government from granting titles of
nobility,173 and Article I, Section 10 imposes the same prohibition on the states.174
However, the normative principle of equality was not exhausted with the establishment of a republic; it has also proven useful in opposing arbitrary discrimination of
any form.175 In his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson176 opposing statesponsored racial segregation, Justice John Harlan noted (ruefully, defiantly, hopefully) that:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest
is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man,
and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when

172

See Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the
Individual Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1739,
1742 (1992) (“An important characteristic of the political feudal regime is that feudal leaders,
within their respective geographic areas, possess great discretion in their exercise of authority
over dependents who have sworn personal allegiance to their lords.”).
173
U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 8.
174
Id. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
175
For example, Lincoln compared slavery to monarchy, stating that both institutions were
grounded in “the same tyrannical principle.” Abraham Lincoln, Seventh and Last Debate
with Senator Stephen A. Douglas at Alton, Ill. (Oct. 15, 1858), reprinted in 3 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 1, at 315. Lincoln stated:
That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this
country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be
silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and
wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have
stood face to face from the beginning of time; and will ever continue
to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the
divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it
develops itself. It is the same spirit that says, “You work and toil and
earn bread, and I’ll eat it.” No matter in what shape it comes, whether
from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own
nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as an
apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle.
Id.
176
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved.177
Of all of the aspects of the principle of “popular sovereignty,” the matter of
equal political rights has undergone the greatest change and the most dramatic
transformation since the founding. The Constitution originally provided that United
States Senators were to be appointed by the state legislatures;178 it still dangerously
provides that Presidential Electors are to be appointed in the manner directed by the
state legislatures.179 Only the members of the House of Representatives were to be
elected by the people.180 Furthermore, the franchise was limited to a small minority
of the people; women, blacks, and men without property were disenfranchised.181
177

Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years . . . .”).
179
See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”).
180
See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”).
181
See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“Property qualifications and poll taxes have been a traditional part of our political structure.
In the Colonies the franchise was generally a restricted one.”); id. at 684–85 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (offering several justifications for property qualifications and poll taxes). Justice
Harlan stated:
[I]t is only by fiat that it can be said, especially in the context of
American history, that there can be no rational debate as to their
advisability. Most of the early Colonies had them; many of the States
have had them during much of their histories; and, whether one agrees
or not, arguments have been and still can be made in favor of them. For
example, it is certainly a rational argument that payment of some
minimal poll tax promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who
do not care enough about public affairs to pay $1.50 or thereabouts a
year for the exercise of the franchise. It is also arguable, indeed it was
probably accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage of
Americans through most of our history, that people with some property
have a deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more
responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of
confidence, than those without means, and that the community and
Nation would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such
citizens. Nondiscriminatory and fairly applied literacy tests . . . find
justification on very similar grounds.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Charles S. Daskow & David A. Sonner, Vox Populi: Is It
Time to Reform the Electoral College?, 55 FED. LAW. 33, 34–35 (2008) (describing
differences in number of qualified voters in different states at the time of the founding based
on race and property).
178
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The most numerous and obvious changes to the text of the Constitution over the
intervening centuries have been to broaden the franchise and strengthen our democracy. The Fifteenth Amendment extends the vote to blacks and other racial minorities;182 the Seventeenth Amendment provides for the direct election of United States
Senators;183 the Nineteenth Amendment extends suffrage to women;184 the Twentythird Amendment grants the residents of the District of Columbia the right to vote
for President;185 the Twenty-fourth Amendment abolishes poll taxes in federal
elections;186 and the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowers the voting age in federal and
state elections to eighteen years.187
In recent decades the Supreme Court has contributed to this process of democratization by outlawing “white primaries,”188 banning poll taxes in state elections,189
invalidating malapportionment schemes190 and striking down other devices intended
to deprive persons of equal opportunity to participate in the political process or to
make their vote less effective.191 Moreover, to permit meaningful participation by
every person in the political process, the Supreme Court now accords substantial
protection to the rights of political expression192 and political association,193 and has

182

U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
Id. amend. XVII.
184
Id. amend. XIX, § 1.
185
Id. amend. XXIII, § 1.
186
Id. amend. XXIV, § 1.
187
Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
188
See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down the rules of the
Democratic Party of Texas forbidding blacks from voting in primary elections).
189
See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax in state
elections).
190
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down malapportionment scheme
for state legislative districts).
191
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (striking down at-large system of voting that
deprived blacks of representation in county government); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (striking down law redrawing boundaries of City of Tuskegee to exclude black
population).
192
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (finding that there is “a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”).
193
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech.”).
183
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also struck down barriers to equal opportunity for education.194 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, landmark
legislation that opened the political process to blacks and other minorities.195 All of
the foregoing decisions strengthen our democratic institutions, which, according to
John Hart Ely, is a principal function of constitutional law.196 As the Supreme Court
said in 1996 in United States v. Virginia,197 “[a] prime part of the history of our
Constitution . . . is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections
to people once ignored or excluded.”198
The principle that every individual has an equal right to vote received its highest
expression in Reynolds v. Sims,199 which applied the previously-established principle
of “one person, one vote” to cases of malapportionment.200 In its decision, the Court
stated:
To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. . . . A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more
nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm. This
is the clear and strong command of our Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause. This is an essential part of the concept of a
government of laws and not men. This is at the heart of Lincoln’s vision of “government of the people, by the people, [and]
for the people.” The Equal Protection Clause demands no less
than substantially equal state legislative representation for all
citizens, of all places as well as of all races.201

194

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (ordering state to admit women to
state military college on an equal basis with men); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(striking down state law requiring undocumented alien children to pay tuition to attend public
school); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down official racial
segregation of the public schools).
195
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding 1965 Voting
Rights Act as a valid enactment under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment).
196
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87–104 (1980) (setting forth the theory of “representation-reinforcement”).
197
518 U.S. 515 (ordering the state of Virginia to admit women to state military college
on the same basis as men).
198
Id. at 557.
199
377 U.S. 533 (1964) (striking down apportionment scheme that permitted gross
variations in numbers of persons among state legislative districts).
200
Id. at 558 (“The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence,
to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 672 U.S. 368,
381 (1963))).
201
377 U.S. at 567–68 (footnotes omitted).
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The Reynolds Court also linked the principle of equal rights of citizenship to the
concept of majority rule: “Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State
could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”202
Despite this substantial progress, barriers to equal participation still exist in the
political process. A notable problem yet to be resolved is that of “political gerrymandering”—the Supreme Court has still failed to develop a legal standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of districting schemes that deprive a political party
of representation proportionate to its voting strength.203 There is and no doubt
always will be tension between the principle of equality and discrepant custom204 or
other legitimate objectives,205 but the tide of history has flowed strongly towards
broadening the franchise and removing obstacles to full and complete political
equality.
E. Separation of Church and State
Because the right to rule arises from the will of the people and not from God,
the principle of popular sovereignty necessarily implies the separation of church and
state.206 The dominions of church and state are distinct because their powers are
derived from different sources of authority.207
The dispute over separation of church and state in America traces back to the
earliest colonial days. Within a few years of their arrival on these shores, two
groups of Massachusetts Puritans contended over the proper role of religion in the
government of the colony.208 On the one side was the ruling oligarchy of Massachusetts led by Governor John Winthrop; on the other stood Roger Williams and other

202

Id. at 565.
See League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (failing to agree upon
a standard for evaluating the constitutionality of politically-gerrymandered districts).
204
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 1 (requiring each state to have equal representation in
the United States Senate); id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (setting number of presidential electors from
each state to equal number of senators and representatives combined).
205
See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding state law
requiring government issued photo identification to vote).
206
See Jónatas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 451, 459 (2005) (“John Locke articulates a consistent political theory
based on individual autonomy, popular sovereignty, limited government, separation of
powers and separation of Church and State.”).
207
Id. at 452 (describing sources of authority for the separate dominions of church and
state).
208
See generally JAMES ERNST, ROGER WILLIAMS: NEW ENGLAND FIREBRAND 97–137
(1932) (describing the conflict between Roger Williams and the authorities of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony).
203
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religious dissenters.209 Historian James Ernst describes the conflict as centering on
the dual principles of popular sovereignty and separation of church and state:
The Bay was for a union of church and state with the church in
authority; [Williams] was for complete severance of church and
civil state with the church subordinate in civil things. The Bay
was a theocracy and an oligarchy; he upheld the sovereignty of
the people and the rights of man and “right reason.”210
The authorities of Massachusetts Bay accused dissenters, such as Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson, of the crime of heresy, and exiled them upon conviction.211 These actions only increased the Colony’s thirst for purity. Two decades
later, the Bay Colony executed four Quakers.212 A generation later, in 1692, a
general madness overcame the Massachusetts Puritans, and they executed twenty
persons at Salem whom they thought to be witches.213 The Puritans felt justified in
inflicting these punishments because they believed that the laws against heresy and
witchcraft reflected the will of God.214
In contrast to the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Roger Williams, the
founder of Rhode Island, argued that the people are sovereign. In 1644, he wrote:
“the sovereign, original, and foundation of civil power lies in the people . . . .”215
The same year he also coined the phrase “separation of church and state,” arguing
that the leaders of Massachusetts Bay had made a fateful error in mixing the two
institutions: “[W]hen [the Church] have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of
Separation between the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of the world, God
hath ever broke down the wall itself . . . and made His Garden a Wilderness as at

209

Id. at 136.
Id.
211
See id. at 134 (sentence of banishment pronounced upon Williams); id. at 211 (Anne
Hutchinson and about thirty of her followers banished in 1638).
212
Id. at 375.
213
See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome
and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43, 43–44 (2001)
(describing the Salem witch trials).
214
Id. at 49.
215
ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE, DISCUSSED, IN A CONFERENCE BETWEENE TRUTH AND PEACE (1644) reprinted
in PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 147
(1953).
210
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this day.”216 Roger Williams welcomed people of all faiths, including Jews, to settle
in Rhode Island.217
The same battle over separation of church and state was waged again in the
1780s in the newly-founded State of Virginia. This time the protagonists were
Governor Patrick Henry on one side and James Madison and Thomas Jefferson on
the other.218 Governor Henry proposed a law that would have imposed a tax for the
support of the teachers of Christian education.219 Madison and Jefferson opposed
this law, and instead they secured the passage of Jefferson’s famous Bill for Religious Liberty.220 The following year, the framers of the Constitution adopted a
provision abolishing any religious test for holding public office,221 and two years
216

Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 52
n.73 (2006) (quoting Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton’s Letter Examined and Answered (1644));
see also id. at 52 (noting that “Roger Williams coined the phrase ‘wall of separation’”);
ERNST, supra note 208, at 279 (“The political program of Roger Williams called for absolute
liberty of conscience, separation of church and state, and people’s sovereignty, that is,
government by consent of the governed of all classes . . . .”). But see PERRY MILLER, THE
NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 454 (1954) (“Even Roger Williams’
assertion of toleration came not from a political or constitutional scruple but from a
conception of the spiritual life so exalted that he could not see it contaminated by earthly
compulsion.”).
217
See ERNST, supra note 208, at 350 (speaking of the Jews, Williams stated it was the
duty of the chief magistrate of the colony to “make way for their free and peaceable
habitation amongst us”).
218
See CHARLES CERAMI, YOUNG PATRIOTS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF TWO MEN,
THEIR IMPOSSIBLE PLAN, AND THE REVOLUTION THAT CREATED THE CONSTITUTION 61–64
(2005) (describing the conflict over Henry’s bill to provide an annual contribution to support
the Christian religion).
219
Id. at 61–62.
220
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1947) (describing the efforts of
Madison and Jefferson in opposing the tax and securing the enactment of the Virginia Bill
for Religious Liberty); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, (1786), reprinted in FOUNDING AMERICA, supra note 34, at 301–03 (“Almighty
God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or
burthens . . . are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion. . . . No man
shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry . . . or
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be
free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion . . . .”);
JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in FOUNDING AMERICA, supra note 34, at 295 (“[W]e hold it for a
fundamental and unalieniable truth, ‘that religion, or the duty which we owe to the Creator
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction . . ., not by
force or violence.’ The religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate.”).
221
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”).
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after that Congress adopted the First Amendment, which commences with the
words: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”222
As with almost all of our rights, the right to separation of church and state lay
dormant in the courts until the accession of the Roosevelt Court.223 In 1940, the
Supreme Court incorporated the Religion Clauses into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,224 and in 1947 Justice Hugo Black issued his famous
opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, finding that the Establishment Clause
demands the separation of church and state.225 Subsequent cases adopted the rule
that the government must remain neutral with respect to religion;226 later still, the
Court embraced the standard that the government may not endorse religion.227 Over
the past seven decades, the Supreme Court has issued numerous opinions regarding
government-sponsored prayer,228 the display of religious imagery on public land,229
and public funding to religious institutions.230
In my opinion, the single most important question that the Court has faced in the
area of Separation of Church and State is whether the government has a legitimate
interest in enforcing religiously motivated moral norms. This question frequently
arises in right to privacy cases because many religious organizations take strong
positions on issues such as abortion and equal marriage rights for gay and lesbian
couples.231 In his opinion dissenting from the decision of the Court in Bowers v.
222

U.S. CONST. amend I.
See Huhn, Roosevelt Court, supra note 159.
224
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (ruling that the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are among the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
225
Everson, 330 U.S., at 16 (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and
State.’”(citation omitted)).
226
See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for
our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”)(citations omitted).
227
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (adopting
the standard that the government may not “endorse” religion).
228
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down practice of prayer at
public school graduation).
229
See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (ordering removal of display of Ten
Commandments from county courthouse); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(permitting display of statue of Ten Commandments on statehouse grounds).
230
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding parental voucher
option as applied to public, charter, private, and parochial schools).
231
See Editorial, The Myths of Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES NOV. 2, 2008, at A31 (opposing
Proposition 8 and stating, “Religions and their believers are free to define marriage as they
please; they are free to consider homosexuality a sin. But they are not free to impose their
definitions of morality on the state.”); Janet Hook & Noam N. Levey, Health Bill Picking Up
Key Votes: Some Reluctant Democrats Fall into Line, and a Coalition of Nuns Gives Its
223

2010]

CONSTANTLY APPROXIMATING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

37

Hardwick232 to uphold the constitutionality of a state statute making sodomy a crime,
Justice Harry Blackmun argued that the state’s invocation of religious authority in
support of the statute actually undermined the constitutionality of the law:
The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether
the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its
conformity to religious doctrine. Thus, far from buttressing his
case, petitioner’s invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas
Aquinas, and sodomy’s heretical status during the Middle Ages
undermines his suggestion that [the statute] represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power. A State can no more punish
private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can
punish such behavior because of racial animus.233
Justice Blackmun’s position in Bowers reflects the fact that in the United States
religious authority is not law. American lawyers and judges do not cite scripture or
the statements of religious leaders as authority for what the law is. Neither the
Bible, the Koran, nor the Torah may be legitimately invoked in determining the
validity or the interpretation of regulations, ordinances, statutes, or constitutional
provisions. The proper interpretation of American law depends upon the intent of
the people who wrote or adopted the law, not the presumed intent of God. To the
extent that the Court’s decision in Bowers was based upon religious custom, it
conflicted with the equally longstanding custom of not relying upon religious
authority to interpret the law.
Seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas234 the Supreme Court reversed
Bowers, but it did not adopt Justice Blackmun’s reasoning condemning religious
intolerance. Instead, the majority expressly adopted the reasoning that Justice John
Paul Stevens had articulated in his dissenting opinion in Bowers that “the fact that

Support, L.A. TIMES Mar. 18, 2010, at AA1 (noting that the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops had put out a statement opposing the health care reform bill in Congress because the
proposed law inadequately protected against the use of federal funds to finance abortions);
Letter from the First Presidency of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to Church
Leaders in California (June 30, 2008), available at http://newsroom.lds.org/ ldsnewsroom/
eng/commentary/california-and-same-sex-marriage; William F. Murphy et al., Health Care
for Life and for All, On Faith, Wash. Post (Mar. 20, 2010, 3:30 AM), http://newsweek
.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/2010/03/health_care_for_life_and_for_all.html
(opposing health care reform on the ground that the bill inadequately protects against the use
of federal funds to pay for abortions).
232
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state law criminalizing consensual acts of sodomy as
applied to homosexuals).
233
Id. at 211–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted).
234
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state law making same-sex intercourse a crime).

38

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:000

the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”235
In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O’Connor expressed a similar view
that “moral disapproval” by itself is an illegitimate basis for such laws.236 By
contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia takes the position that the majority of the people
have the right to enact their moral and religious views into law.237 The proper role
of morality and religion will remain at the center of the debate over the constitutionality of laws affecting the right to privacy.
In the present day the debate over popular sovereignty and the separation of
church and state defines the conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and western
democracy. Popular sovereignty is anathema to Islamic fundamentalists precisely
because it requires the separation of church and state.238 Islamists sincerely believe
that the law of man may not contradict the law of God.239 The influential Islamist
political author Sayyid Qutb wrote:
This religion [Islam] is really a universal declaration of the
freedom of man from servitude to other men and from servitude
to his own desires, which is also a form of human servitude; it
is a declaration that sovereignty belongs to God alone and that
He is the Lord of all the worlds. It means a challenge to all
kinds and forms of systems which are based on the concept of
the sovereignty of man; in other words, where man has usurped
the Divine attribute. Any system in which the final decisions are
referred to human beings, and in which the sources of all authority are human, deifies human beings by designating others than
God as lords over men. This declaration means that the usurped
authority of God be returned to Him and the usurpers be thrown
out—those who by themselves devise laws for others to follow,
thus elevating themselves to the status of lords and reducing
others to the status of slaves. In short, to proclaim the authority
235

Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 583 (“Moral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal
classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
237
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia would have upheld
the state constitutional amendment prohibiting the enactment of nondiscrimination laws
protecting gays and lesbians on the ground that the amendment represents an attempt to
“preserve traditional sexual mores.”).
238
SAYYID QUTB, MILESTONES 58 (Unity Publishing Co. Rev. ed. 1981).
239
See id.; Kent Benedict Gravelle, Islamic Law in Sudan: A Comparative Analysis, 5
I.L.S.A.J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1998).
236
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and sovereignty of God means to eliminate all human kingship
and to announce the rule of the Sustainer of the universe over the
entire earth.240
Professor Kent Gravelle has observed: “Although it may be difficult for a
Westerner to understand, in an Islamic state, the government, religion, and law are
inseparable.”241 The refusal of Islamists to accept the principles of popular sovereignty and the separation of church and state—their fear that these principles are
incompatible with Islam—is a principal cause of their failure to enter the modern
world.242
However, the battle for the future of Muslim society—the dream of Islamic
democracy—is slowly making headway.243 In contrast to Qutb, Tassaduq Hussain
Jillani, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, has argued that Islam is
consonant with democracy.244 Justice Jillani has stated that “[A]lthough sovereignty
theoretically lies with God Almighty, man has been made a deputy of divine
authority—a delegatee of that power. The delegatees—in this case the people—in
turn elect their assembly who, for all practical purposes, exercise the divinely
delegated political power as a polity.”245
Qutb and Jillani are treading the same path taken by Winthrop, Williams, Henry,
and Madison as they seek to reconcile religious devotion with self-government. As
the principle of popular sovereignty gathers support in the Muslim world, recognition of the principle of separation of church and state will inevitably follow.
F. The Power of the National Government Over the States

240

QUTB, supra note 238.
Gravelle, supra note 239, at 1–2 (identifying four groupings of countries depending
upon how strictly each country applies Islamic law).
242
See, e.g., FATIMA MERNISSI, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: FEAR OF THE MODERN WORLD
(Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1992) (describing how many Muslims have rejected modernity in
reaction to the humiliation and frustration that they experienced during the period of
colonialism, and how they do not trust the institution of democracy because it is a western
ideal).
243
See Fareed Zakaria, The Jihad Against the Jihadis: How Muslim Leaders Waged War
on Extremists—and Won, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 2010, at 26 (“In most Muslim nations,
mainstream rulers have stabilized their regimes and their societies, and extremists have been
isolated. This has not led to the flowering of Jeffersonian democracy or liberalism. But
modern, somewhat secular forces are clearly in control and widely supported across the
Muslim world. Polls, elections, and in-depth studies all confirm this trend.”).
244
See Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, Democracy and Islam: An Odyssey in Braving the
Twenty-First Century, 2006 BYU L. REV. 727 (2006) (arguing that Islam is compatible with
democracy).
245
Id. at 735.
241
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Two decades ago, in his brilliant essay Of Sovereignty and Federalism, Akhil
Amar drew the distinction between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty and
persuasively argued that this Nation was founded upon the latter and not the
former.246 There is abundant evidence to support this proposition, including the
dramatic differences between the Articles of Confederation and the text of the
Constitution;247 statements of drafters such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and James Wilson;248 early decisions by the Supreme Court authored by John
Marshall249 and Joseph Story;250 and famous speeches by Daniel Webster251 and
Abraham Lincoln.252 All this evidence supports the basic idea that the Constitution
emanated from the people and not from the states. This understanding animated not

246

Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987)
[hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism].
247
See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. But see Kurt Lash, The Original
Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly”
Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1891–92 (2008) (contending that courts
and commentators are “almost certainly wrong” in concluding that the omission of the word
“expressly” in the Tenth Amendment means that the framers intended for the national
government to have more implied powers than under the Articles of Confederation).
248
See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 246, at 1437.
249
See McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 402–04 (1819). Justice Marshall stated:
In discussing this question, the counsel for the State of Maryland
have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the
constitution, to consider that instrument not as emanating from the
people, but as the act of sovereign and independent States.
....
From these Conventions the constitution derives its whole
authority. The government proceeds directly from the people; is
“ordained and established” in the name of the people; and is declared
to be ordained, “in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
ensure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to
themselves and to their posterity.” The assent of the States, in their
sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a Convention, and thus
submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect
liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the
affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State governments. The
constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and
bound the State sovereignties.
250
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324 (1816) (“The constitution of the
United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign capacities,
but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by ‘the people of the United
States.’”).
251
See Speech of Senator Daniel Webster to the Senate, The Constitution Not a Compact
Between Sovereign States, (Feb. 16, 1833), in 3 WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 448, 479–86
(Boston, C.C. Little and J. Brown 1851).
252
See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text.
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only the adoption of the Constitution but also the defense of the Union in the Civil
War.253
Despite this persuasive evidence supporting the primacy of popular sovereignty,
throughout American history there have been elements who insist on elevating the
opposing principle of “state sovereignty.” During the antebellum period “states
rights” became the battle cry of nullifiers and secessionists in support of slavery.254
After the Civil War, state sovereignty remained the principal argument in opposition
to the protection of newly-freed slaves,255 and “states rights” was the constant refrain
of segregationists up to and throughout the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and
1960s.256 In the late nineteenth century, these racists were joined by industrialists
253

See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65.
255
See Wilson Huhn, The Legacy of Slaughterhouse, Bradwell, and Cruikshank in
Constitutional Interpretation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1051, 1073–79 (2009) (contending that the
Supreme Court erred in its interpretation of the State Action Doctrine, leaving blacks
unprotected in their fundamental rights); Wilson Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the
Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379, 1427–51 (2006) (arguing that
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to grant Congress the power to prevent
private parties from interfering with fundamental rights, at least in the event that the states
failed to act).
256
See, e.g., Governor George C. Wallace, 1963 Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963),
available at http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs_list/InauguralSpeech.html. Governor
Wallace said:
Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis stood, and took
an oath to my people. It is very appropriate then that from this Cradle
of the Confederacy, this very Heart of the Great Anglo-Saxon
Southland, that today we sound the drum for freedom as have our
generations of forebears before us done, time and time again through
history. Let us rise to the call of freedom-loving blood that is in us and
send our answer to the tyranny that clanks its chains upon the South.
In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw
the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny . . .
and I say . . . segregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . .
segregation forever.
....
This nation was never meant to be a unit of one . . . but a united of
the many . . . . that is the exact reason our freedom loving forefathers
established the states, so as to divide the rights and powers among the
states, insuring that no central power could gain master government
control.
....
And so it was meant in our racial lives . . . each race, within its
own framework has the freedom to teach . . to instruct . . to develop .
. to ask for and receive deserved help from others of separate racial
stations. This is the great freedom of our American founding fathers .
. . but if we amalgamate into the one unit as advocated by the
254
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seeking immunity from federal laws outlawing abusive practices such as monopolization and child labor,257 and for fifty years the Supreme Court enthusiastically
enforced their agenda under the banner of “state sovereignty.”258 Not until the midtwentieth century did the Roosevelt Court and the Warren Court recognize Congress’s power to adopt laws protecting workers and racial minorities.259 Historically,
“state sovereignty” was used to diminish the right of the American people to defend
themselves from oppression. As Akhil Amar so eloquently described these cases,
“[w]henever the rhetoric of ‘states’ rights’ is deployed to defend states’ wrongs, our
servants have become our masters; our rescuers, our captors.”260
In recent years the Supreme Court has revived the concept of “state sovereignty,”261 describing the principle as “a fundamental postulate [] implicit in the
constitutional design.”262 As Professor Timothy Zick has pointed out in a number
communist philosophers . . . then the enrichment of our lives . . . the
freedom for our development . . . is gone forever. We become,
therefore, a mongrel unit of one under a single all powerful government
. . . and we stand for everything . . . and for nothing.
Id.
257

See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, Is Government the Problem or the Solution?, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 495, 502 (1996) (stating, “the Republican Party came to regard a strong
federal government as a danger to corporate ascendancy . . . .”).
258
See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(striking down National Industrial Recovery Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (striking down federal Child Labor Law); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1 (1895) (striking down the Sherman Antitrust Act as applied to manufacturing); SCHWARTZ,
supra note 159, at 182–84, 212–13, 232 (1993) (describing decisions of Supreme Court
narrowly construing the power of Congress over interstate commerce).
259
See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding power
of Congress to enact Civil Rights Act of 1964); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (upholding power of Congress to enact the National Labor Relations Act);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 159, at 237, 242–43 (describing decisions upholding Congress’s
power to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause).
260
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 246, at 1520.
261
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress could not subject
state to suit in state courts without its consent); Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, supra note
8, at 243–47 (describing the history of the concept of “state sovereignty” in the Supreme
Court). But see Terrence M. Messonnier, A Neo-Federalist Interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment, 25 AKRON L. REV. 213 (1991) (interpreting the Tenth Amendment as
recognizing the principle of state sovereignty).
262
Alden, 527 U.S. at 729; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“We enforce the ‘outer limits’ of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority not
for their own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal
encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist
system of government.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“the intrusion [on state sovereignty] is significant” and “contradicts the federal
balance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce”); New York v. United
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of articles, this terminology has a rhetorical purpose.263 To speak of “state sovereignty” is to confuse a State with a Nation, and to speak of “states’ rights” is to
confuse a State with an individual.264 In the service of this doctrine the Court has
placed certain limits on the scope of Congress’s power. It has struck down some
legislation on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce
Clause265 and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment;266 it has ruled that state
officials may not be “commandeered” to enforce provisions of federal law;267 and
it has invoked the concept of “state sovereignty” to limit the power of Congress to
enact laws granting individuals wronged by the state an action for money
damages.268
States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) (“Whether one views the take title provision as lying
outside Congress’ enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure
of our Government established by the Constitution.”). But see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (“We doubt that courts ultimately can identify
principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers
over the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.”).
263
See Timothy Zick, Active Sovereignty, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 541, 543
(2007) [hereinafter Zick, Active Sovereignty] (“Sovereignty has enormous rhetorical
power.”); Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, supra note 8.
264
Professor Zick states:
The core of the federalism revival has been the transformation of
states, from something akin to corporate forms to far more dignified
nations or persons. Almost by sheer linguistic fiat, the Court has
bestowed on states not only the inherent “dignity” of nations or
persons, but a host of constitutional rights as well. Today states, like
nations and persons, have “rights” to privacy, autonomy, equality, and
due process. Nothing in the Constitution itself mandated this change in
status. It is the result of what the Court itself has called “background
principles” and constitutional and historical suppositions. Dignity,
esteem, and the new states’ rights are, the Court has said, inherent
attributes of statehood. They follow naturally from the fact of being
what the Constitution minimally refers to as a “state.”
Id.
265
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down Violence Against
Women Act as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
266
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as beyond the power of Congress under § 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment).
267
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state law enforcement officers to run
background checks on gun buyers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(striking down a provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 on the ground that the law required state legislatures to take title to radioactive
waste).
268
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).
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A practical justification for the principle of state sovereignty is that if the states
are permitted to experiment with legal and social innovations, other states or the
federal government may learn from their experience. As Justice Louis Brandeis
stated in this oft-quoted passage from his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.269
These words were quoted most recently by Justice O’Connor in her dissenting
opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, arguing that the states should have the freedom to
adopt laws permitting the medical use of marijuana.270
There is one area where the states clearly are not sovereign. Ever since the case
of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation,271 it has been understood that the
states have no authority in matters of foreign affairs because they lack “sovereignty”
with respect to foreign nations.272 Even during a time when the Supreme Court
limited the authority of Congress to enact statutes regulating interstate commerce,
the Supreme Court upheld a treaty that governed the treatment of migratory birds.273
During this same period the Court often struck down laws making broad delegations
of authority to the Executive Branch but upheld a law conferring broad discretion
on the President to make it illegal to sell arms to the participants of a conflict in
South America.274 In recent decades the Court has struck down a number of state
269

285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
271
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding law delegating power to President to determine
whether it would be a criminal offense to sell arms to the combatants in a South American
conflict).
272
Id. at 316 (“As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting as
a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies
severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States
of America.”); see also id. at 316–17 (discussing sovereignty theory at length).
273
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (“To answer this question it is not
enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United
States, because by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by
Article VI treaties made under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution
and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the
land.”).
274
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20 (1936) (“It is important to bear in mind that
270
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laws denying equal benefits to aliens—even undocumented aliens—on the ground
that only the federal government has authority to regulate immigration and naturalization.275 The principle of state sovereignty presents no barrier to the enforcement
of international law;276 however, the principle of national sovereignty does. That is
the subject of the following portion of this article.
G. National Independence and the Changing Role of International Law
The seventh and final manifestation of the principle of popular sovereignty is
that the American people as a whole are sovereign and are therefore independent of
any foreign power. Even though the founding generation relied upon principles of
international law in declaring our independence,277 Americans resist the notion that
domestic law may be overridden by international law.278 Opposition to international
law is based upon the idea that the invocation of treaty provisions, orders of international bodies, or the interpretations of the law by foreign tribunals all diminish the
sovereignty of the American people.279
we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.”).
275
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down state law requiring
children of undocumented aliens to pay tuition to attend public schools); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down state welfare laws discriminating against
non-citizens).
276
But see Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (finding that ruling of International
Court of Justice, which held that United States had violated Vienna Convention by failing
to notify criminal defendant of his rights under the Convention, did not preempt state laws
governing challenges to criminal convictions).
277
See Cindy G. Buys, Burying Our Constitution in the Sand? Evaluating the Ostrich
Response to the Use of International and Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Interpretation,
21 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 15–16 (2007) [hereinafter Buys, Burying]. Professor Buys states:
Two areas of international law were particularly relevant to the
creation and development of the United States as a constitutional
government and its protection of individual rights. First, the
international law concept of sovereignty helped the fledgling United
States to gain international recognition and imposed obligations on the
federal government vis-à-vis other nations, as well as towards its own
subjects. . . . Second, the evolution of the meaning of sovereignty
paralleled the development of international human rights law.
Id.
278
See Zachary Larsen, Discounting Foreign Imports: Foreign Authority in Constitutional
Interpretation & the Curb of Popular Sovereignty, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 767, 778 (2009).
279
See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: HOW AMERICAN
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As a consequence, American courts have developed a number of doctrines that
diminish the effectiveness of international law. These include the concept of nonself-executing treaties;280 the deference granted to the executive branch in the
interpretation of treaties;281 the power of Congress to revoke a treaty;282 and the
power of the President to unilaterally abrogate treaty obligations.283 Finally, in the
area of constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court has been slow to rely upon
constitutional authority handed down by constitutional courts from other
countries.284
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ARE BEING SACRIFICED TO THE GODS OF THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1998) (opposing growing influence of international law); JEROME R. CORSI,
AMERICA FOR SALE: FIGHTING THE NEW WORLD ORDER, SURVIVING A GLOBAL DEPRESSION,
AND PRESERVING U.S.A. SOVEREIGNTY (2009)(same); KRASNER, supra note 20, at 125
(characterizing the invocation of national sovereignty against external influences of
international human rights laws as “organized hypocrisy” and noting “Many contemporary
observers have seen human rights as an issue area in which conventional notions of
sovereignty have been compromised. They are right.”); NATHAN TABOR, THE BEAST ON THE
EAST RIVER: THE UN THREAT TO AMERICA’S SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY (2006); Larsen,
supra note 278, at 769 (“reliance upon foreign and international law in construing
constitutional provisions for purposes of judicial review should be rejected . . . .”).
280
See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (finding the Vienna Convention to be a non-selfexecuting treaty, and refusing to accord domestic effect to the decision of the International
Court of Justice enforcing the Convention); David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort
Statute, and the Domestic Status of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 488 (2010)
(discussing the non-self-execution doctrine); id. at 507 (“Medellín directly limits the
domestic role of treaties in U.S. courts and indirectly undermines reliance on [customary
international law] by the federal judiciary.”).
281
See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 87 (2009) (noting that “legal doctrine has long called for especially strong
foreign affairs deference to the Executive”). But see David J. Bederman, Medellín’s New
Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (2008) (describing what he
views in Medellín as a break from past practice in treaty interpretation).
282
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (“[A]n Act of Congress, which must comply
with the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders
the treaty null.”).
283
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (refusing to overturn unilateral decision of
President to abrogate self-defense treaty with Taiwan after he recognized Communist China
as the legitimate government of China).
284
See Buys, Burying, supra note 277, at 1. Professor Buys states:
In the last few years, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued several
high-profile opinions that refer to international and foreign law,
igniting a heated debate among the justices, legal scholars, politicians,
and commentators regarding the proper use of international and foreign
law in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Justice Scalia, usually joined by
Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, has led the fight against
the use of foreign and, to a lesser extent, international law as a basis for
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International law is steadily becoming more important in two areas: international trade and human rights.285 In my opinion, it is likely that due to globalization,
businesses will demand that there be uniform laws in order to facilitate the creation
of a worldwide market for their goods and services. Similarly, consumers will
demand access to information and freedom from dangerous products wherever they
are produced, and workers will seek to eliminate unfair practices in competing labor
markets around the world. Businesses, workers, and consumers will all demand the
elimination of abusive practices and unfair methods of competition.286
In the context of human rights there will also be a demand for greater and more
uniform protection. As noted above, during the administration of George W. Bush,
Justice Department officials issued opinions promoting the doctrine of “the unitary
executive,” in which they asserted that the President could ignore existing treaties
governing the detention and treatment of prisoners, either because those treaties did
not apply or because the Constitution authorized the President to ignore them.287
The Supreme Court rejected this broad interpretation of the power of the President,
ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld288 that the President is bound by the provisions of the

constitutional decision-making. Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kennedy,
O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, and White have asserted that international
and foreign law have relevance to their work and that it is not
inappropriate to refer to such sources in their decision-making.
Id. (citations omitted).
285
See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights—Past, Present, and
Future, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 797 (2003) (examining increase in scholarly commentary on
human rights law and international trade law).
286
See Cindy Galway Buys, The United States Supreme Court Misses the Mark: Towards
Better Implementation of the United States’ International Obligations, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L.
39, 40 (2008) (“[T]reaty-based obligations increasingly affect relations between the United
States and its sub-federal units of government, in part because the subject matter of these
treaties is expanding into areas traditionally regulated by the states. Non-state actors, such
as individuals and businesses, frequently find that they also are directly affected by these
international agreements.”); id. at 76 (“Given current trends, it appears highly likely that the
United States and its citizens will be interacting more and more with other actors from
around the world. As this trend towards globalization continues, the United States will
increasingly be forced to determine how it will comply with various international obligations
it may undertake to facilitate international trade and travel and other relations.”); see also
Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Power to Regulate “Commerce with Foreign Nations” in a
Global Economy and the Future of American Democracy: An Essay, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
25, 42 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court would interfere with America’s ability to
negotiate international agreements regulating the global economy, stating, “the Lopez opinion
stands as a potentially crippling barrier to competitiveness in nation-state negotiation over
the terms of political control of the globalized market.”).
287
See supra note 142.
288
548 U.S. 557 (2006) (granting prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus relief).
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Uniform Code of Military Justice289 and that the prisoner was entitled to a trial that
was consistent with the mandates of the Geneva Conventions.290
As the nations of the world become more involved in each other’s affairs,
questions of international law are bound to arise more and more frequently, both in
the area of economic regulation and in the area of human rights. Just as power over
business regulation and civil rights passed from the states to the national government
after 1937 in the United States,291 so too in the next century governmental power
will inevitably pass to international bodies, which are the only entities capable of
dealing with problems such as global warming, slave labor, or torture of prisoners.
In my opinion, America and other nations will become reconciled to a regime
of international law to the extent that such a system is congruent with the overarching principle of popular sovereignty. If international law is perceived as diminishing
the freedom and independence of the American people, we should expect our
citizens to continue to reject its legitimacy in the name of national sovereignty.292
In contrast, if international law is understood as expressing the will of the people—if
it reinforces principles of limited government and protects individual rights—if it
is employed to restrain the actions of terrorist organizations that kill and maim
civilians, multinational corporations that engage in abusive business practices, and
rogue states that threaten the peace—international law will be accepted as a vital
instrument in promoting equal justice under law.293
289

Id. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent
congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers.”).
290
See id. at 625 (ruling that the trial of petitioner violated the Geneva Conventions).
291
See EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941) (describing the
Court’s shift towards upholding the constitutionality of commercial and social legislation);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 159, at 234 (“A remarkable reversal in the Supreme Court’s attitude
toward the New Deal program took place early in 1937.”).
292
See Larsen, supra note 278. With respect to the related question of whether the
Constitution accords rights to all of humanity, see J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical
Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 487–88 (2007). The author states:
Although many Founders may have believed that “all men” were
naturally equal in their God-given rights-bearing capacity, as the
Declaration of Independence suggested, it does not necessarily follow
that they also thought that the government created by the U.S.
Constitution would protect and enforce the constitutional rights of all
men everywhere. . . Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Founders
approached the task of writing a constitution or bill of rights in
1787–1789 with the intent to enshrine natural rights of all mankind.
293
See Knowles, supra note 281, at 87 (proposing a “hegemony” theory under which
American courts would lend legitimacy and stability to international law by ending deference
to the executive branch interpretation of it); see also Buys, Burying, supra note 277, at 54
(suggesting that sovereignty theory indicates that the courts should give effect to
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CONCLUSION
In the Declaration of Independence, the founders of this Nation recognized the
consent of the people as the legitimate source of all political power.294 Their
understanding of the concept of popular sovereignty is embodied by a number of
interrelated and mutually supporting principles, including the rule of law, limited
government, individual sovereignty, equal political rights, Separation of Church and
State, limited state sovereignty, and national sovereignty. The Constitution—“the
voice of the whole American people”295—made these principles into law.
But these principles were incompletely recognized at the founding. At that time,
democracy was circumscribed by the twin facts that relatively few federal officers
were elected directly by the people and relatively few citizens enjoyed the right to
vote. The states were not subject to the Bill of Rights and were therefore free to
deprive their residents of even the most elemental rights. The Constitution expressly
countenanced slavery.
Even after slavery was abolished and the states were made subject to the
Constitution, the Supreme Court failed to enforce its provisions. For one hundred
and fifty years after the Constitution was written and for seventy years after the
Fourteenth Amendment was approved in Congress, the Supreme Court was reluctant
to recognize and protect even those individual rights which were explicitly set forth
in the Constitution.
As Edmund Morgan stated, however, the ideal of popular sovereignty has
“continually challenged” our society “to reform the facts of political and social
existence to fit the aspirations it fosters.”296 In the centuries since the founding, and
particularly since the investment of the Roosevelt Court in 1937, the interrelated
principles of popular sovereignty have undergone enormous transformation.
Although the government exercises broad new powers, its exercise of those powers
is subject to the rule of law in the form of constitutional restraint including the
separation of powers. The Supreme Court now protects the rights of the individual,
international law when it expands human rights). Buys states:
Under the dictates of sovereignty theory, the Court would never be
forced to adopt a foreign practice that is less protective of the people
because that would be contrary to the entire purpose for which the
government was created. Rather, the Supreme Court should continue
to use foreign and international law to expand our conception of human
rights consistently with the Constitution and should use international
law as an interpretive and educational tool in appropriate circumstances
as outlined above.
294
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
295
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816).
296
See MORGAN, supra note 2, at 306.
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including the right to participate in the democratic process on an equal basis with
other persons. The Separation of Church and State is now enforced, and the will of
the whole American people as represented in Congress has largely achieved ascendancy over the sovereignty of the states. Looking to the future, international law
seems destined to play a greater role in our society. Its acceptance and concomitant
success will depend upon the extent to which it reflects the myriad values represented by the principle of popular sovereignty.

